


This article was downloaded by: [Tulane University]

On: 15 October 2014, At: 14:36

Publisher: Routledge

Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954

Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK



## Contemporary Security Policy

Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:

<http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fcsp20>

### The Coming Stability? The Decline of Warfare in Africa and Implications for International Security

David T. Burbach & Christopher J. Fettweis

Published online: 10 Oct 2014.

To cite this article: David T. Burbach & Christopher J. Fettweis (2014): The Coming Stability? The Decline of Warfare in Africa and Implications for International Security, Contemporary Security Policy, DOI: [10.1080/13523260.2014.963967](https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2014.963967)

To link to this article: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2014.963967>

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the "Content") contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly

forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at <http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions>

# The Coming Stability? The Decline of Warfare in Africa and Implications for International Security

DAVID T. BURBACH AND  
CHRISTOPHER J. FETTWEIS

---

*Abstract:* Anarchy was coming to Africa, Robert Kaplan warned in 1994, and a surge in conflict initially seemed to confirm that prediction. With less fanfare, however, after the year 2000, conflict in Africa declined, probably to the lowest levels ever. Recent fighting in Libya, Mali, South Sudan and elsewhere has prompted a new wave of ‘Africa falling apart’ concerns. This article reviews the history and data of conflict in Africa, from pre-colonial times to the present. Historical comparison and quantitative analysis based on the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) and Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV) datasets on the 1961–2013 period show that Africa has experienced a remarkable decline in warfare, whether measured in number of conflicts or fatalities. Warfare is a relatively low risk to the lives of most Africans. The years 2010–2013 saw an increase of 35 per cent in African battle deaths over 2005–2010, but they still are 87 per cent lower than the 1990–1999 average. Changes in external support and intervention, and the spread of global norms regarding armed conflict, have been most decisive in reducing the levels of warfare in the continent. Consequently, there is no Africa exception to the systemic shift towards lower levels of armed conflict.

---

‘Africa’s immediate future could be very bad’, Robert Kaplan famously wrote in 1994. Anarchy and upheaval driven by overpopulation were coming, he predicted, which would soon produce a continent where ‘foreign embassies are shut down, states collapse, and contact with the outside world takes place through dangerous, disease-ridden coastal trading posts’.<sup>1</sup> While Kaplan’s forecast was particularly bleak, few observers at the time were optimistic about Africa’s future. Thomas Homer-Dixon detected ‘the early signs of an upsurge of violence in the coming decades that will be induced or aggravated by scarcity’, while Jeffery Herbst predicted wars of conquest and even the elimination of smaller African states.<sup>2</sup> *The Economist* ran a cover story in 2000 with the headline ‘Hopeless Africa’, a view that was and sometimes still is common among scholars and practitioners.<sup>3</sup>

Was such pessimism warranted? A quarter century after the end of the Cold War, what can now be said about conflict in Africa? In many corners, the image of an Africa wracked with chaos and conflict has not greatly changed. Indeed, recent fighting in Mali, South Sudan and elsewhere has prompted a new wave of ‘Africa falling apart’ concerns. Many policymakers expect Africa to experience continuing warfare,

insurgencies, terrorism, mass atrocity and even superpower rivalry. As a result, the United States military is more focused on Africa today than ever before.<sup>4</sup>

The ‘war-torn Africa’ view is out of date. Contrary to pessimistic forecasts, the reality is that Africa has become dramatically more peaceful over the last 15 years. Not only has the 1990s surge of violence abated, but the level of warfare is lower now than in any other post-colonial decade. A good case can be made that Africa is more peaceful now, in relative and absolute terms, than at any time in history. This emerging transition is important in its own right – and certainly welcome to Africans – but also has important policy implications as the level of warfare declines relative to other African challenges, and it speaks to broader international relations debates about the global decline in conflict.

This article has two purposes. First, it reviews the history of conflict in Africa, from antiquity to the present day, in order to identify trends and assess relative intensity. The focus is a quantitative analysis (using Uppsala and Center for Systemic Peace datasets) of the post-independence period up to the end of 2013. While others noted the decline in conflict after 2000, this is the first study to examine the supposed return to conflict after 2010.<sup>5</sup> Another analytic contribution is a focus on the human impact of warfare in deaths and specifically mortality risks in the context of other risks. The actual threat to life is a highly relevant measure of the impact of warfare, and it reveals that the threat of organized violence to Africans has declined much more than an undifferentiated count of conflicts suggests.

Second, this article offers explanations for the observed decline in conflict, including a variety of possible political, economic, military and normative factors. Dramatic changes in the nature of external support and intervention, aided by economic growth, are particularly strong candidates. We also suggest that the spread of global norms against armed conflict has made an impact – there may be a lag – but there is no *Africa exception* to the systemic shift towards lower levels of armed conflict. These trends are mutually reinforcing, so if anarchy is no longer coming to Africa, one can reasonably hope it will never arrive.

### **Warfare in Pre-Colonial and Colonial Africa**

Any effort to conduct a systematic analysis of warfare trends in Africa over time runs into an immediate, seemingly insurmountable problem: there is virtually no reliable historical data. Many major, bloody events no doubt occurred in the distant past that went entirely unrecorded and are lost to history. This problem has led most scholars who have made assessments on the history of warfare to ignore pre-colonial Africa completely, in the apparent belief that the unmeasurable is unimportant.<sup>6</sup> Although few definitive statements can be made that would satisfy the standards of evidence now common in the field, a brief overview of pre-colonial African history should give pause to any suggestion that previous eras were free of violence and warfare.

Archaeologists and anthropologists can give some insight into Africa prior to contact with Europeans. Across the world the societal evolution seems to have gone through three broad phases: first, hunter/gathering groups emerged, which over time were pushed off desirable lands by rapidly expanding tribes of the

second phase, or those that had developed agricultural and/or herding techniques. In the final stage, the population of farming communities grew to the point where people could specialize, build towns and – importantly for these purposes – raise armies. If the archaeological and ethnographic record offers any consistent findings, it is that conflict was central to all three of these stages.<sup>7</sup>

The precise level of pre-colonial violence may be contentious, but there was no region of the continent where Europeans encountered the unspoiled peace of the post-colonial imagination.<sup>8</sup> Records from the era are better than those from preceding times, but remain unreliable, in part due to motivated bias: European colonialists may have felt a need to exaggerate pre-conquest savagery to justify their rule as victory over the barbarism, ignorance and primordialism.<sup>9</sup> Critics of the colonial venture were (and are) pulled in the opposite direction, understating pre-colonial violence or even making it appear as if Europeans brought the idea of warfare to Africa. Violence pre-dated conquest, however, as did other behaviours that scholars of international relations would expect for actors in an anarchic, self-help system. European explorers found alliances in the Great Lakes region, for instance, and security-dilemma dynamics affected every place where complex societies had evolved.<sup>10</sup> ‘Domino-effect militarization occurred’, explained Reid, ‘as communities armed themselves to defend against predatory states (as states invariably were).’<sup>11</sup> It is worth emphasizing that violence was almost certainly proportionately greater than it is today, for at no point in the pre-colonial period was Africa’s population greater than eight per cent of current levels.

Colonization was accompanied by an increase in conflict.<sup>12</sup> Two factors appear to account for the rise of violence prior to full colonization: guns and the slave trade. Though the European powers on occasion fought their own battles, more commonly they backed local allies. The introduction of firearms, which was not haphazard or astrategic, allowed local powers to settle old scores and/or conquer their neighbours, often with European encouragement.<sup>13</sup> Guns poured into West Africa: between 283,000 and 394,000 per annum were imported 1750–1800, and another 50,000 to the Congo every year.<sup>14</sup> Predatory, militarized states such as Dahomey, Oyo, Asante, Segou and Lunda used the riches from the slave trade to expand, enslave yet more of their neighbours, and enrich themselves further.<sup>15</sup>

Casualty figures during the European conquest are uncertain and suffering has no doubt been minimized in official and unofficial records.<sup>16</sup> Bloodshed was widespread as European control consolidated, though the character of violence varied: in some areas, Europeans met only passive opposition, and may have brought a somewhat welcome measure of economic and political stability. More commonly, the Europeans crushed enemies with the ruthlessness they reserved for ‘savage’ peoples.<sup>17</sup> The violence of the era, especially in outlying areas, remains under-reported and under-studied. Any stability that colonial rule brought was almost always accompanied by injustice and racism, as well as daily brutality and oppression. Colonialism planted the seeds of its own destruction, though, and primed an explosion of violence after independence.

Conflict data becomes more reliable – somewhat – for the decolonization period of the 1950s through the 1970s. Many new states achieved independence with very

little conflict; others, like Algeria or the Portuguese colonies, suffered enormously. The optimism that accompanied decolonization tended to fade quickly in most countries, giving way to instability, violence and/or tyranny. Postcolonial politics too often became zero-sum; dictators of various degrees of venality emerged almost everywhere, ranging from the merely cruel and greedy (Mobutu in Zaire) to the pathologically sadistic (Amin in Uganda). Weak and unstable governments often fell to military coups (38 of which were successful between 1963 and 1978).<sup>18</sup> Major internal conflicts were experienced by Angola, Burundi, Congo, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda, while smaller conflicts erupted elsewhere.<sup>19</sup>

External factors exacerbated Africa's suffering. Both the United States and the Soviet Union saw Africa as an important source of strategic resources and a venue for political competition. Western and Soviet-bloc assistance to rebel groups and the governments seeking to suppress them turned local conflicts into Cold War proxy battlefields in nearly a dozen new states. By one reckoning, three million people died as a result of conflict during the 1980s alone.<sup>20</sup> The end of the Cold War saw widespread, factionalized fighting in many countries weakened by the loss of superpower support – what Kaplan saw as emerging anarchy. The latter part of the 20th century was violent for much of Africa; the next section turns to quantitative analysis of that era and more recent years.

### **Post-Independence Trends in African Conflict**

The existence of more data, and in particular of several quantitative datasets, allows for a more rigorous investigation of trends over the last several decades. Several widely cited databases allow an analysis of three main indicators, which together give a good sense of the magnitude of armed conflict in Africa: the number and intensity of armed conflicts; death toll (combatants and civilians); and mortality risk. Previous work has used portions of this data, but this study offers a combined view with analysis of the strength and weakness of various measures in the African context. The attention to mortality risk as well as casualties is novel, providing policy-relevant context given Africa's population growth and other threats to life confronting Africans. All of these indicators show that while the 1990s were tragic, armed conflict since subsided to historic lows.

Two core data collections were used: the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) and Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV). The UCDP datasets track organized violence in the form of state-based and non-state conflicts, and one-sided violence against civilians, including counts of direct battle deaths.<sup>21</sup> We also use the Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV) dataset from the Center for Systemic Peace (CSP).<sup>22</sup> The Uppsala data is very familiar to scholars of international politics, conservative in both definition and data verification of battle deaths. MEPV includes an intensity measure of conflicts, and complements the UCDP's strict 'battle death' measure with estimates of total related deaths for each conflict.<sup>23</sup> Since there is inherent subjectivity in temporally and spatially bounding a given conflict, MEPV is also useful to compare to the UCDP's population of

conflicts – trends common to both datasets are less likely to result from coding idiosyncrasies.<sup>24</sup>


*Number of Active Conflicts*

The natural starting point is counting the number of active conflicts. In this section, we examine overall trends using both UCDP and MEPV data. UCDP distinguishes between ‘wars’, with at least 1,000 battle deaths, and ‘conflicts’, with 25 to 999 battle deaths. A threshold as low as 25 deaths is problematic, so the analysis is limited to those conflicts with 1,000 or more battle deaths.<sup>25</sup> The Uppsala data also distinguishes between armed conflict involving states, purely non-state conflicts, and one-sided violence (for example, mass killings of civilians by a state).

Figure 1, left panel shows the number of wars in progress in Africa by year through the post-independence period. Note that this measure does *not* show the actual level of fighting in a given year, but shows *all* wars which have not yet terminated, even if the war was dormant in that year.<sup>26</sup> While this is an often-used measure of ‘active’, it is more meaningful to look at year-by-year levels of activity. The right panel of Figure 1 tallies African conflicts with more than 1,000 battle deaths in each individual year, as well as the non-state conflicts and episodes of one-sided violence with 1,000 or more killed in a given year.

Consistent with the ‘coming anarchy’ argument, violence spiked in the 1990s. Contrary to popular impressions, though, African conflict has since *declined*: wars in progress decreased by about one-third after 2001, and wars with intense fighting by declined by more than half. This decline was noted in earlier studies using 2009 UCDP data by Paul Williams and by Scott Straus, but there are some noteworthy new observations in Figure 1.<sup>27</sup> First, the analysis is extended here to 2013.

FIGURE 1  
ACTIVE WARS IN AFRICA, 1961–2013 (UCDP)




Source: Uppsala Conflict Data Program (2014).  
 Note: Non-State + One-Sided series begins 1989.

Despite the conventional wisdom that 2011–2013 saw a great increase in African conflict, the data is more nuanced. Active wars defined broadly remained mostly flat. The level of intense fighting climbed, but still remained much lower than that of the 1990s and even lower than in the 1970s or 1980s.

The MEPV dataset also tracks conflicts, but usefully, it also codes an intensity level for each conflict on a one to ten ordinal scale.<sup>28</sup> This allows a more meaningful comparison of levels of warfare, since small and large conflicts are not equated. A categorical scale is far from ideal, but the MEPV project uses consistent coding rules over time and across regions, making broad comparisons feasible. Figure 2 shows the sum of conflict intensity scores for Africa and for the rest of the world from 1961 through 2013.<sup>29</sup>

The MEPV measures tell a similar story: African conflict reached a peak in the 1990s, but has since declined – significantly. Conflict intensity in the last ten years has been lower by one-third to more than half compared to the 1990s. Indeed, this represented a dramatic change in a long-term trend. Africa experienced a gradual increase in total conflict since the 1960s through the 1990s. What is less recognized, though, is that the continent then rapidly transitioned to a lower level of conflict after the turn of the century. This reflects, among other peaceful developments, the ebbing of violence in West Africa, the end of civil wars in Angola and Algeria, the end of the worst fighting in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and in Sudan. All around the continent, wars ended or de-escalated. It is true that the period 2010–2013 has seen an increase in conflict over 2005–2010,

FIGURE 2  
AFRICA AND WORLD CONFLICT INTENSITY (MEPV), 1961–2013



Source: Center for Systemic Peace (2014).



but both the Uppsala data and the Center for Systemic Peace data show that the amount of active warfare is still lower than previous levels.

The ‘rest of world’ comparison in the MEPV data is instructive. Conflict outside Africa peaked in the late 1980s and fell rapidly over the next decade, while conflict in Africa increased. Indeed, in the late 1990s total conflict intensity in Africa alone was greater than in the rest of the world combined. It is not surprising that the notion of an ‘African exception’ to the systemic decline in warfare became popular. With a lag, though, Africa appears to be following the trend to reduced conflict. As further confirmation of this trend, using its own measures the Human Security Centre has also noted the remarkable decline in African violence.<sup>30</sup> The Australian NGO Visions of Humanity’s annual ‘Global Peace Index’, has shown for the last several years that sub-Saharan Africa is no longer the world’s ‘least peaceful region’.<sup>31</sup>

Conflicts have declined in number and intensity in Africa. The trend applies to all sub-regions, though not evenly. Conflict spanned the continent in previous decades, but has vanished from southern Africa and withered in west Africa. Conflict today is almost entirely confined to a landlocked zone through the Sahel into the eastern Congo. In that area alone, conflict has scarcely declined. Overall Africa experienced a tragic 1990s, but the first years of the 21st century have seen conflict recede to a post-independence low.


### *Death Toll and Risk from African Conflicts*

While scholars often focus on counting conflicts per se, their human impact is of great relevance. This section examines the death tolls and mortality risks of African conflicts; as the data will show, deadliness has declined even more rapidly than the number of active conflicts. Two major measures are used: ‘battle deaths’, from UCDP and a related dataset from the Peace Research Institute – Oslo (PRIO), which count specific reports of combatants and civilians killed directly in combat,<sup>32</sup> and the MEPV’s consensus historical estimates of total deaths, which includes indirect mortality caused by the wars.<sup>33</sup> Quantifying casualties is admittedly difficult – data can be hard to come by and of questionable validity – but to put conflicts into a policy-relevant context, it is important to know what impact they have really had. Looking at both classes of data gives a useful range: the UCDP and PRIO data represent lower bounds, while MEPV plausible and widely accepted totals.<sup>34</sup> Since consistent methodologies are used over time, trends are likely to hold even if the absolute numbers are uncertain.

Figure 3 shows total battle deaths in Africa according to the merged PRIO and UCDP datasets. Battle deaths in Africa reached a high plateau during the superpower proxy wars, followed by intense spikes in the 1990s – Ethiopia/Eritrea, Zaire/DRC, and the unrivalled Rwanda mass killings in 1994.<sup>35</sup> The last decade, however, has seen the lowest numbers of battle deaths of *any* post-independence period – from 95,000 per year in the 1990s to fewer than 15,000 per year after 2002.

The MEPV estimates of total conflict deaths from the Center for Systemic Peace show a similar decline. Two data issues should be noted. MEPV only reports total deaths per conflict, not year-to-year variations. An annual average is used in this analysis, but that means casualties are overstated for protracted conflicts that are

FIGURE 3  
AFRICA BATTLE DEATHS (UCDP), 1961–2013




Sources: UCDP (2014); PRIO (2009).

less bloody now than in years past (for example, Somalia or Darfur).<sup>36</sup> The eastern Congo conflict is a special problem: the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo is probably the deadliest African conflict, yet data is poor. Credible estimates of related deaths range from 200,000 to more than five million.<sup>37</sup> The MEPV codes a single conflict in eastern DRC from 1996 to the present, with 2.5 million deaths. With so many deaths, the entire African trend is sensitive to treatment of the DRC conflict. Sources do generally agree that the vast majority of conflict deaths happened in the 1996–2002 period. For consistency we use MEPV's 2.5 million figure, but split the series with 80 per cent of the deaths before 2002, and 20 per cent after – probably a conservative split.<sup>38</sup> Figure 4 shows the trends for Africa *excluding* the DRC, the DRC estimate on its own, and the rest of the world.

Figure 4 shows a pattern similar to the battle death data: gradual increase, 1990s peaks, and then a substantial decline in the last dozen years. As with the number of conflicts, it is understandable that 20 years ago Africa appeared an anomalous exception to the global trend away from war. From independence to 1990, Africa accounted for 20–50 per cent of the world's conflict deaths each year, but then in the late 1990s may have been the location of 80 per cent or more of the global total. Today Africa's share is still disproportionate – around half – but it does not stand so far apart.

Note that the decline in deaths in the Congo is not the only factor in this decline. With the DRC fighting completely excluded, the decline in conflict deaths relative to the 1990s or to previous decades is still present. If high estimates for *current* deaths in the DRC are correct, then total conflict deaths in Africa today may be close to 1970s/1980s figures, but as discussed later, the lower range of estimates is more credible.

FIGURE 4  
AFRICA AND WORLD CONFLICT DEATHS (MEPV), 1961–2013



Source: Center for Systemic Peace (2014).

### *Mortality Risk from Armed Conflict*

Raw casualty counts are one measure of the impact of warfare, but the risk faced by individuals is also important. The population of Africa is growing rapidly – doubling in just over 25 years – so even if war deaths were constant over 50 years, the risk to any individual would have declined significantly. Figure 5 divides the UCDP/PRIO and MEPV annual death series by population, to show the overall mortality rate from conflict in Africa.<sup>39</sup>

According to either data source, Africans now face a lower risk of death from armed conflict than during any other post-independence decade. The UCDP data shows nearly a 90 per cent reduction in the mortality rate from battle deaths. The broader MEPV count shows a smaller reduction, though that is sensitive to estimates of recent conflict-related deaths in the DRC. In either case, the increase in conflict after 2010 does not change the multi-decade trend. The likelihood of dying from conflict is greater in Africa than in the rest the world, but the gap is shrinking. In 1999, an African was 40 times as likely to die in armed conflict as residents of other regions. In 2013, the disparity was an order of magnitude smaller:  $7.5\times$  by MEPV, and only  $3.0\times$  from Uppsala data.

War is less of a threat to life in Africa than everyday accidental injuries or non-political violence. War not only kills fewer people than do malaria or HIV, but kills fewer people than many less prominent diseases do. Even in the DRC, the World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that more people are killed by traffic accidents than by war and civil conflict. This is a new phenomenon for Africa: given higher conflict mortality and fewer vehicles in the past, more were probably killed by conflict than by road crashes in past decades.<sup>40</sup> As another point of

FIGURE 5  
ARMED CONFLICT MORTALITY RATES, 1961–2013




TABLE 1  
SELECTED SOURCES OF MORTALITY IN AFRICA, 2008

Cause of Death	Death per 100,000 People	Rank
HIV/AIDS	161.8	1
Malaria	94.0	4
Diabetes mellitus	23.0	12
Road traffic accidents	20.9	14
Violence (e.g. criminal, domestic)	20.1	17
Protein-energy malnutrition	13.2	22
Accidental drowning	5.3	39
War and civil conflict	3.6	49
Prostate cancer	3.0	55
Leprosy	0.1	102

Source: *Global Burden of Disease, 2008 Update* (Geneva: World Health Organization, August 2011), Table 1.

comparison, the WHO-estimated death rate from war is only 1/10th of the homicide rate in South Africa, or 1/25th the rate of El Salvador and Honduras. An American citizen is more likely to be murdered than an African is to die (directly) from armed conflict.<sup>41</sup>

Other measures add to the impression of growing continental stability. The African state system has been more resilient than pessimists expected. Jeffrey Herbst observed that many African nations are ‘precisely the kind of states that before 1945 were routinely invaded and taken over by stronger states’, yet his prediction of warfare and conquest has not come true – the map of Africa remains almost unchanged.<sup>42</sup> State failure has not increased in the last decade, and the rate of

coups – successful or unsuccessful – has declined.<sup>43</sup> The Minorities at Risk project at the University of Maryland reports that the number of groups experiencing high levels of political discrimination dropped in half from the 1980s to the present.<sup>44</sup>

Overall, then, Africa has been more peaceful over the last decade than at any time in its history. This does not imply that the continent is without problems. While security in Africa is better than generally realized, local conflicts persist, particularly in the Sahel; some even escalate. Deaths from warfare remain above the global average. Nevertheless, Africa is more peaceful, and the trend is generally moving in a positive direction. Policymakers should note in particular the decline of warfare as a cause of untimely death in Africa relative to accidents, disease, and domestic violence. For the first time in Africa's history, there is real reason to believe that war, one of the great scourges of humanity, may be waning in what had been one of its last refuges.

### Objections and Responses

The claim that Africa is more peaceful now could face a number of methodological and theoretical criticisms. This section addresses four general concerns: (1) critiques of the measurement of number of conflicts; (2) critiques of mortality estimates; (3) the possibility that recent violence is reversing the trend; and (4) the objection that warfare may be declining, but other forms of violence remain common.

#### *Decline in Number of Conflicts*

There are several technical objections one might make to the claim that the number of conflicts in Africa is lower today than in the 1990s, all centring around the general question of 'what to count'. Some researchers prefer to look at *all* conflicts identified by UCDP, thus using a threshold of only 25 deaths. By that measure African conflict is nearly flat from 1970 through the present. An undifferentiated 25 deaths threshold is not very policy-relevant, though; it equates an isolated shootout with the entire Ethiopia–Eritrea war. A low threshold also makes comparisons over time difficult due to 'chronological bias'.<sup>45</sup> Forty years ago, a remote 'conflict' that killed several dozen might never have been reported in global media. Researchers today have far better information on small-scale events.<sup>46</sup> In addition to the size threshold, other researchers prefer to count dyads (namely, each pair of adversaries in a multi-side conflict). Factions are an important measure for some research questions, but it is not clear that highly fragmented conflict should count as 'more conflict' – especially since there has been a trend for African conflict to become more factionalized over time.<sup>47</sup>

#### *Death Tolls*

The data regarding deaths from warfare in Africa is notoriously unreliable. Conflicts are often in inaccessible locations. Participants may lack capability to accurately track casualties, and have reason to misrepresent them.<sup>48</sup> Indirect civilian deaths to war-related famine or epidemics are especially problematic; causal relationships are not simple. Supposedly 'independent' observers may not be unbiased; the most prominent casualty-estimating NGOs are also advocates for humanitarian assistance

and intervention.<sup>49</sup> A good case can be made that data collection in Africa is better now than it has ever been. The various challenges that beset conflict demographers – remoteness, hostility, incentives to mislead – have always been present, but today there is widespread recognition of these challenges and robust debate over how best to overcome them, as well as multiple potential sources of information.

One systematic problem could be that recent complex, irregular conflicts are deadlier for civilians relative to combatants than previous wars – a claim notably made in Mary Kaldor's *New and Old Wars*.<sup>50</sup> If so, reported battle deaths of combatants could decline, yet mask an increase in the civilian toll. Were that the case, however, the MEPV estimates should reflect the trend since those numbers are *total* deaths, not just battle deaths. More directly, recent studies find that the ratio of civilian-to-combatant casualties has *not* changed over time.<sup>51</sup> Proponents of the 'new wars' thesis are surely correct when pointing out that civilians suffer horrifically during post-Cold War conflicts, but it is not the case that the combatants in Biafra, Katanga, Mozambique and other Cold War battlefields were gentlemen following the Marquis of Queensberry rules. Post-Cold War conflicts may even be *less* deadly for civilians than earlier conflicts.<sup>52</sup>

The most important specific controversy is the fighting in the DRC from 1996 to the present. The scale of war deaths is so large that the numbers can drive the entire African trend. UCDP battle deaths are several tens of thousands in the late 1990s, then a few hundred per year after 2002. Estimating *total* dead (as in the MEPV dataset) is more difficult. The International Rescue Committee (IRC) famously reported 5.4 million deaths from 1996 to 2007, with deaths still happening at a million per year. Note that only 0.6 per cent of those deaths were from violence; most were from infectious diseases, which the IRC attributed to conflict.<sup>53</sup> Other groups strongly criticize the IRC's methodology and estimate conflict deaths at 700,000 and perhaps as low as 200,000 for the same period.<sup>54</sup> The MEPV dataset codes 2.5 million, presumably as a middle ground. Note that even the IRC reports that actual violence (as opposed to lingering epidemics) fell sharply after 2002.<sup>55</sup>

For consistency and to avoid 'cherry-picking,' the analysis above used the 2.5 million figure as coded by the MEPV project. Doing so probably overstates the number of war deaths in the 1990s by a factor of four or five, and even more for current DRC conflict deaths. On the other hand, if the high IRC estimates for deaths during the peak years are correct, then Africa's mid/late 1990s spike in violence was truly extreme, nearly ten times deadlier each year than in any other modern period. The *decrease* after 2000 would have been all the greater in that case too, however. The one circumstance that would challenge the case for decline is if IRC estimates for recent mortality are correct, *and* if one attributes *all* of the above-average disease burden in the DRC to conflict. Given the country's extreme poverty relative to the rest of Africa and the poor medical infrastructure inherited from the Mobutu era, that seems an unreasonable assumption.

Some scholars question the utility of using casualty data at all.<sup>56</sup> Casualty figures are no doubt wrong in detail, but this does not necessarily imply that they are also wrong in aggregate. If estimates within an order of magnitude are correct, the broad trend analysis here is still meaningful. The MEPV and UCDP datasets have

some primary sources in common; they do not perfectly overlap, yet show parallel trends. Nor is there reason to expect temporal bias; if anything, reporting technology and growth in NGO and news media attention should incline recent estimates higher compared to previous decades. The assertion that conflict-related mortality is lower now than in decades past does not depend on high precision in casualty counts in remote regions.<sup>57</sup>

*Recent Events: Is the Trend Reversing?*

The years after 2010 saw several unfortunate developments in Africa: new or significantly escalated conflicts in Libya, Mali, Nigeria, Central African Republic, and South Sudan. Perhaps instead of a decline in violence, there was merely a lull. There are two aspects to that concern: whether the current situation represents a change, and what it bodes for the future. At 2013 levels, armed conflict is up from a 2005 low, but still down from any previous decade. Both datasets used cover to the end of 2013 and even beyond, since their South Sudan numbers appear to include January 2014. UCDP battle deaths for 2011–2013 are 35 per cent higher than the 2005–2010 average, but, they are still 87 per cent lower than the 1990–1999 average. The number of active wars is up (Figure 1, right panel), but well below pre-2000 levels. There has also been good news since 2010, like reduced conflict in eastern DRC and improved security in Somalia. Even in South Sudan, the weekly updated ACLED dataset shows violence decreasing from January through August of 2014, though certainly the country remains volatile.<sup>58</sup> Violence today receives far more media coverage than past African conflicts of similar magnitude, which might contribute to exaggerated perceptions. When 100,000 died in Burundi in 1993, the *New York Times* carried one page 20 story during the killings and a handful of retrospective stories later. In 2013, fighting in South Sudan (10,000 dead) received six front page stories, over 20 interior stories, and several editorials.<sup>59</sup>

The course of future wars is speculative, of course, but the ‘Explaining the Decline’ section below details reasons we believe long-term political and economic trends support peace. The conflicts of the last two years do not disprove those trends; recent outbreaks occurred exactly where forces for peace are least developed. South Sudan suffers widespread poverty, no real state institutions, is in the midst of a wrenching transition, experienced a negative economic shock (oil export reductions and aid cuts), and is awash with unemployed fighters and weapons. Few other African countries have ever possessed so many conflict warning signs. Recent efforts of third parties – the African Union and United Nations, China, France and the United States, etc. – to damp new conflicts have also been faster and stronger than in past decades. Still, there are some scenarios that could break the decline in the human toll of war. South Sudan poses the greatest risk; increased fighting and associated famines are not out of the question. Civil wars – as opposed to terrorism and low-level violence – in Nigeria or Egypt could quickly amass huge body counts. While very unlikely in either country, they are not inconceivable. The odds are on the side of growing peace, but key countries bear watching.

The reduction in conflict from about 2000–2005 did not continue in a straight line – had it done so there would be zero conflict by now – but levels have hardly

returned to those of the 1990s. The perception that things are falling apart is simply not reflected in the data.

### *Is 'Peace' Merely the Absence of War?*

Finally, some might object to talk of 'peace' in Africa given high levels of criminal and interpersonal violence on the continent.<sup>60</sup> It is true that Africa has high homicide rates; as a region, second only to Central and South America.<sup>61</sup> It is worth distinguishing between warfare and criminal violence, however. From a scholarly standpoint, a high incidence of interstate conflict or civil war has different implications for security than do car-jackings in Johannesburg or honour killings in Egypt. More important, the relevant policy responses to criminal violence are quite different from those appropriate to political and military conflict.<sup>62</sup> We recognize there is a grey area; armed groups' objectives may be both political and criminal.<sup>63</sup> Nevertheless, 'warfare' is still a sufficiently important and distinct category that its decline in Africa is of great significance, even if one objects to describing the mere absence of war as evidence of peace.<sup>64</sup>

### **Explaining the Decline**

Is the current decline temporary, or are lower levels of violence a welcome 'new normal'? A brief review of possible explanations for the downturn may give insight into not only the current era of peace, but also the likely future direction of conflict trends in Africa. The discussion here cannot make conclusive cases for any of them, but all have support in the international relations and comparative politics literature, and are well worth continuing study. Democratization and economic growth, even if less robust than in other regions, have made African nations internally less prone to armed conflict. Externally, a critical factor has been the decline in external encouragement and indirect support for combatants. Finally, the growing global norm against warfare may possibly be showing influence in Africa. These trends are mutually reinforcing, raising the hope of ongoing virtuous cycles.

#### *Democracy*

Few theories have become as widely accepted in the international relations community as the 'democratic peace', or the suggestion that democracies do not fight each other (and, somewhat more controversially, are generally less war-prone). Perhaps it has been the spread of democracy, even in inchoate and incomplete forms, that has brought unprecedented stability to Africa.

It is not clear, however, that democratization provides the best explanation of the decline in violence. For one thing, levels of democracy in Africa are still low: the most recent evaluation from *The Economist's* Economic Intelligence Unit rates only Mauritius as a 'full democracy'. Eight others earned the title 'flawed democracies'.<sup>65</sup> Freedom House rates ten African countries (with 13 per cent of the region's population) as 'free', and 21 other states as 'partially free'.<sup>66</sup> Second, evidence for the democracy–peace link is much stronger for external wars than intrastate conflicts. While there are studies that suggest that democracies are marginally more likely to



solve their internal disputes peacefully, the ‘democratic peace’ is a theory of international relations, not comparative politics.<sup>67</sup> Since the vast majority of African conflicts are internal, the power of regime type to account for their presence or absence is weakened.

Timing is also problematic for the democracy argument. In the 1970s and 1980s, African nations’ average Polity IV Democracy score was in the –5 to –6 range, or very non-democratic.<sup>68</sup> A rapid increase occurred in the early 1990s as many dictatorships crumbled, reaching an average around –1. In short, the 1990s spike in conflict followed the wave of democratization. These immature democracies may have been prone to conflict as Snyder and Mansfield have argued, because of opportunist politicians leveraging violent nationalism or tribal identities, though that seems less powerful in African cases than for example, the former Yugoslavia.<sup>69</sup>

The causal arrow between democracy and warfare in Africa may point in the opposite direction: the decline of conflict may have created the space for parties to mobilize and elections to occur. It is hard to imagine elections taking place in Liberia in 2005, for instance, if that country’s civil war had not ended two years earlier. Many of the transitions towards democracy have occurred after the end of conflicts. Democracy may be helping to prevent war’s return, in other words, but it cannot take full credit for its disappearance in the first place. The option to address political grievances at the ballot box has probably undercut the impetus to violence, but it is hard to make the case that Africa is experiencing a Kantian democratic peace.<sup>70</sup>

### *Economic Growth*

Since many of the states in Africa are among the poorest in the world, the ‘capitalist peace’ of prosperity and economic interdependence might not seem to be a likely explanation for the decline of conflict.<sup>71</sup> Research links low per capita GDP to civil conflict.<sup>72</sup> Nevertheless, changing economic fortunes may be an important part of the story. While prosperity and economic interdependence remain lower in Africa than the global north, there is growing optimism about the continent’s economic future. Six of the fastest growing economies between 2000 and 2010 were located south of the Sahara.<sup>73</sup> *The Economist* even moved from ‘Hopeless Africa’ to ‘Emerging Africa’.<sup>74</sup> Economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa is expected to reach 5.2 per cent in 2014; surveys show African publics among the most optimistic in the world.<sup>75</sup> Higher per capita income may reduce conflict, and, probably of more importance, growth and the expectation of future growth promote peace. Individuals see opportunities in growing economies. Growth increases state capacity to provide services, to address grievances, or to buy off disaffected groups without taking away resources from others. In contrast, living standards that are not just low but *declining*, as was common in the 1990s, create incentives for groups to move fast to seize what they can of a shrinking pie – before rivals do.<sup>76</sup>

The chicken-and-egg problem again arises regarding the relationship between economic and security trends, however. Growth and the optimism that accompanies it may contribute to the decline in conflict, but stability facilitates investment. These factors reinforce each other in a virtuous cycle of growth and peace. As former US

Secretary of State Colin Powell told a Ugandan audience, ‘money is a coward’.<sup>77</sup> There is also an international aspect of the virtuous circle: conflict in neighbouring states harms one’s own economy, especially if those neighbours provide crucial transportation links (e.g. for landlocked states).<sup>78</sup> A reduction of conflict in nearby countries thus makes peace and prosperity more achievable in one’s own. The virtuous/vicious neighbourhood effect may explain why remaining conflict in Africa is concentrated in a contiguous zone in the Sahel and northern Great Lakes.

### *External Support*

According to a Kikuyu proverb, ‘when elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers’. Africa had the misfortune of being a field for great power competition for centuries. As others have observed, the decline in destructive intervention and emergence of positive intervention by outside actors is an important part of the decline of conflict.<sup>79</sup> Most obviously, great powers have largely ceased destructive meddling in the security affairs of the continent. The divide-and-conquer policies of the colonial powers and the proxy wars of the Cold War exacerbated local instability – deliberately. Rebel groups and the governments they challenged could count on the Americans or Soviets for weapons, money, political backing, even troops.

Today extra-continental powers usually do not find themselves on opposite sides of African wars. For all the talk of US–China competition in Africa, in practice both generally see their interests aligned in favour of reducing conflict, not fomenting it.<sup>80</sup> Rather than dividing and conquering, international institutions and major powers have more commonly acted in concert, for example in supporting UN and African Union peacekeeping missions in Somalia, Sudan, and Mali. External pressure appears to have led to Rwanda and Uganda reducing support for armed groups in the eastern DRC, thus facilitating UN operations against the ‘M23’ organization.<sup>81</sup> There are some negative exceptions, such as money flowing to Islamic extremists in the Sahel from sympathizers in the Middle East.<sup>82</sup> Overall though an important factor in the decline of armed conflict is the decrease in external support for it.

During the 1990s, when external support dried up many rebel groups turned to alternative sources of funding, notably, plunder of natural resources.<sup>83</sup> UNITA rebels in Angola survived the loss of American funding via diamond exports while the Angolan government was oil funded. In resource-poor Mozambique, however, civil war did not outlast Cold War aid. The extraction-and-export strategy has become more difficult as the world moves, slowly, to limit illegitimate trade. ‘Conflict diamonds’ are not as easy to sell as they were 20 years ago, and the world recently boycotted cocoa from Ivory Coast after then-President Gbagbo tried to hold on to power by force.<sup>84</sup> Factions in the eastern DRC will find it more difficult to sell minerals if Uganda and Rwanda indeed reduce their facilitation of exports from that landlocked region.

There is also now positive intervention. The explosion of UN peacekeeping since the end of the Cold War coincides with the steady drop in violence. There was only one substantial deployment of UN peacekeepers into Africa prior to 1988 (Congo, 1960–1964) but 20 since, as well as European and African Union operations.<sup>85</sup> Andrew Mack of the Human Security Centre gives UN involvement primary credit

for the decline in conflict-related mortality worldwide.<sup>86</sup> Peacekeepers can do little against determined belligerents, but ever fewer seem to exist in Africa. International peacekeeping and mediation deserve some credit for the increased durability of peace settlements and the reduced recurrence of wars.<sup>87</sup>

Peace enforcement efforts have increased alongside peacekeeping.<sup>88</sup> Interventions by France and the United Kingdom in former colonies have often been successful at relatively low cost, from Sierra Leone in 2004 to the Ivory Coast in 2011 to Mali in 2013. Paris won quick UN Security Council approval in December 2013 to deploy a small force to the Central African Republic, which seems to have greatly reduced violence. The United States has stepped up its training and support for African peacekeeping, and its own intervention capabilities, notably via the creation of US Africa Command (AFRICOM). African countries themselves have become more willing to act against outbreaks of violence, diplomatically and sometimes even with peacekeeping forces.

Overall, external pressures no longer exacerbate local instability; to the contrary, today outside powers usually align on the side of peace. Their interventions are not wholly humanitarian – valuing stability can freeze injustice in place, as those living in the Niger delta would attest – but the direct influence of external countries is more conducive for peace now than at any time since outsiders made significant contact with Africa. Two centuries of poisonous policies may have come to an end.

### *Global Norms, and ‘Sameness’*

Every modern state is part of an interconnected international society, where ideas and norms spread with unprecedented rapidity. As Evan Luard explained, even though at any given time states vary in their ‘particular interests and motives, in their political and social structure and in the characteristics of their leaders, all will be to some extent influenced by the aims and aspirations which are instilled by the society as a whole. No state is an island.’<sup>89</sup> Twenty-first-century Africa exists in a complex, globalizing society whose members have been slowly abandoning the recourse to warfare. Its leaders and its people would not be unaffected by such powerful global trends.

As elsewhere in the world, warfare was a natural aspect of politics for most of African history. ‘Periods of rest, or armistice, or resolution, were never taken for granted’, explained Reid, ‘nor were they always particularly welcome, because war was economically, politically and socially important.’<sup>90</sup> Similar beliefs about the positive aspects of warfare were widespread in Europe and the United States until the First World War. That has changed. War is largely considered avoidable and regrettable, not a welcome test of societal virility.<sup>91</sup> There exists now widespread belief that war is not inevitable, that conflict resolution need not involve violence. Perhaps war is on the decline in Africa because 21st-century ideas have evolved, much as ideas on slavery evolved in the 19th century.

The post-Cold War era has been more peaceful than any of its predecessors.<sup>92</sup> There have been no major wars involving rich, industrialized nations for at least six decades – the longest such stretch in history. There are good theoretical reasons to believe that conflict resolution norms in the global north affect decisions

in the south. As Kenneth Waltz argued, systems tend to produce uniform behaviour among individual units, a tendency toward 'sameness'.<sup>93</sup> Success breeds imitation; the behaviour of prestigious states will be copied. Over time, a set of behaviours becomes uniform. Peace may be essentially diffusing out from the global north.

It would be hard for Africa to remain immune from a fundamental transformation in beliefs regarding warfare in broader international society, particularly with modern communications reducing isolation. It is difficult for leaders to credibly claim war is a useful, necessary option when the notion is rejected elsewhere. If war-aversion has become dominant in the global marketplace of ideas in the global north, it would be hard for even determined belligerents to keep it forever out of the south.

The suggestion that a war-aversion norm is spreading to Africa may be too much for some to accept. Modern African despots may not be less venal than those who came before, but if the routes to power, prestige and wealth have changed, they cannot help but have noticed. They need not have turned into pacifists, but if the structure of incentives has changed, so will their behaviour. A similar process appears to be at work elsewhere in what was once considered the 'zone of turmoil'. Latin America is also experiencing the most peaceful era in its history. The 2004 tsunami helped bring an end to one of the few active rebellions in Southeast Asia. The only region seemingly immune to evolving norms is the Middle East.

While it is certainly possible that violence in Africa could return, these potential explanations for the decline in conflict contain grounds for optimism. The continent appears poised for better economic times, and, less certainly, better governance; both trends are likely to reduce armed conflict. External influence is growing, and most of its modern forms reduce incentives to fight. And if an evolution in norms explains some of the decrease, peace may have even more staying power, for normative evolution is typically unidirectional.<sup>94</sup> American public awareness and American foreign policy may not have caught up with these trends, and 'more peaceful' does not mean 'perfect', but there is good reason to expect a safer future for Africans.

\*\*\*\*\*

Anarchy has not come to Africa – at least not in the expanding, all-encompassing way meant by the pessimists of a decade or two ago. The continent is far from uniformly peaceful, and current outbreaks of violence are reminders of the need for more progress. On the whole, however, Africa is less war-torn than at any time in the past, which runs contrary to widespread perceptions that exist even among foreign policy experts. Kaplan remains unchanged, claiming recently that his most important predictions have actually been borne out.<sup>95</sup> However, the evidence suggests that despite neo-Malthusians fears, by most measures life on the continent is improving. War is becoming less of a threat to the life of the average African than emerging middle-income threats like traffic accidents or diabetes. Nor have realist fears of predatory wars and wholesale remaking of the map of Africa come to pass. That is not meant to dismiss the suffering of residents of the Central African Republic, South Sudan or northern Nigeria, nor to suggest that all is well. There are hundreds of millions of Africans who do not face as great a threat of armed conflict as they once did, however. It is important to see Africa as more than 50 distinct countries,

some – and by historical standards, relatively few – of which are beset by warfare, even if they continue to face other, even greater challenges.

Nothing guarantees that these trends will continue. Indeed, several require active maintenance. If the outside world stops responding to African hotspots, at least with diplomatic resources and avoiding support to plunder-financed armed groups, conflict becomes more likely. Intense American–Chinese competition could encourage internal conflict or spur vicious circles of tension between neighbours. The United Nations, former colonizers and AFRICOM have all been useful in helping to bring stability to the continent, but their long-term interest is hardly assured. A global recession or a wave of protectionism could dash optimism about economic growth. But for now, for the first time in quite some time, there is reason for optimism about the decline of warfare in Africa.

What the United States and other outsiders should not do, however, is continue to look at Africa through a lens that overemphasizes conflict and a few crisis-afflicted nations. Additional American support for African peacekeeping capability is welcome, but an increase in American investment in African economies would do even more good for more people. Policymakers should emphasize to the business community how much is now going *right* in Africa. The Obama Administration has taken useful steps in that direction, but at other times shows signs of the ‘Africa-as-Anarchy’ mindset. Programmes to help African governments build capacity outside the military-security sphere could be expanded, such as police and judicial systems, or the infrastructure and service delivery needs of large cities in which a growing share of Africans live.

Africa faces many problems. Peace does not necessarily bring freedom, justice, or prosperity. But today a far greater percentage of people on the continent live without serious risk of dying due to warfare than pessimists expected. On the contrary, ‘end of war’ optimists may prove to be right about Africa too, if on a slower time scale than most of the world. Perhaps a rising generation of leaders and citizens are being influenced by both global norms and expectations of greater opportunities. Africa is surely the hardest test of the global trend away from international conflict. If conflict can no longer find a home there, will it be welcome anywhere?

#### DISCLAIMER

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors alone and do not represent an official position of the Naval War College or United States Government.

#### ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The authors would like to thank Steve Emerson, Jennifer Hazen, Chris Jaspardo, Alan Kuperman, and John Mueller for their helpful comments and suggestions. Any inaccuracies of course remain the responsibility of the authors. The authors can be contacted at: [david.burbach@usnwc.edu](mailto:david.burbach@usnwc.edu) and [fettweis@tulane.edu](mailto:fettweis@tulane.edu)

#### NOTES

1. Robert D. Kaplan, ‘The Coming Anarchy’, *The Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. 273, No. 2 (February 1994), p. 54.

2. Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, 'Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases', *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), p. 6; Jeffrey Herbst, 'War and the State in Africa', *International Security*, Vol. 14, No. 4 (Spring 1990), pp. 134–6.
3. *The Economist*, 11 May 2000. Post-Kaplan examples include Chris Allen, 'Warfare, Endemic Violence, and State Collapse in Africa', *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 26, No. 81 (September 1999), pp. 367–84; James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, 'Neotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak States', *International Security*, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Spring 2004), pp. 5–43; Peter Schwab, *Africa: A Continent Self-Destructs* (New York: Palgrave, 2002); Howard W. French, *A Continent for the Taking: The Tragedy and Hope of Africa* (New York: Vintage Books, 2004); and Martin Meredith, *The Fate of Africa: From the Hopes of Freedom to the Heart of Despair* (Cambridge, MA: Perseus, 2005).
4. The White House, *U.S. Strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, June 2012). See also Craig Whitlock, 'At Pentagon, "Pivot to Asia" Becomes "Shift to Africa"', *Washington Post*, 14 February 2013; David E. Brown, *AFRICOM at Five Years: The Maturation of a Combatant Command* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College Letort Papers, August 2013); and the symposium on AFRICOM in *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 30, No. 1 (April 2009).
5. Paul D. Williams, *War and Conflict in Africa* (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2011), ch. 2; Scott Straus, 'Wars Do End! Changing Patterns of Political Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa', *African Affairs*, Vol. 111, No. 443 (March 2012), pp. 179–201.
6. Neither Quincy Wright (*A Study of War*, 2nd ed. [Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1965]) nor Lewis F. Richardson (*Statistics of Deadly Quarrels* [Pittsburgh, PA: Boxwood, 1960]) made much effort to consider events south of the Sahara. 'Africa' does not even appear in the index to John Keegan's *A History of Warfare* (New York: Knopf, 1993).
7. Robert B. Edgerton, *Sick Societies: Challenging the Myth of Primitive Harmony* (New York: Free Press, 1992); Lawrence H. Keeley, *War before Civilization: The Myth of the Peaceful Savage* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); Steven A. LeBlanc, *Constant Battles: The Myth of the Noble, Peaceful Savage* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2003); and Azar Gat, *War in Human Civilization* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).
8. For regional analyses, see Richard Reid, *War in Pre-Colonial Eastern Africa* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2007); and Robert S. Smith, *Warfare & Diplomacy in Pre-Colonial West Africa*, 2nd ed. (London: James Currey, 1989).
9. The Zulu king Shaka's campaigns in the first half of the 19th century, for example, are routinely reported to have led to the deaths of over a million people, a number that appears to have been invented by British colonialists a century later. The campaigns were brutal, without doubt, but Shaka did not lay waste to the lands of his adversaries and was hardly the genocidal maniac that he was subsequently made out to be. Dan Wylie, *Myth of Iron: Shaka in History* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2008).
10. Richard J. Reid, *Warfare in African History* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 41.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 69.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 109.
13. Thomas Pakenham, *The Scramble for Africa: White Man's Conquest of the Dark Continent from 1876–1912* (New York: Avon Books, 1991). For a specific case, see Arne Bialuschewski, 'Firearms and Warfare in Late Seventeenth and Early Eighteenth Century Madagascar', in Toyin Falola and Raphael Chijoke Njoku (eds), *War and Peace in Africa* (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2010), pp. 57–71.
14. J.E. Inikori, 'The Import of Firearms into West Africa 1750–1807: A Quantitative Analysis', *Journal of African History*, Vol. 18, No. 3 (July 1977), pp. 339–68.
15. Reid, *Warfare in African History* (note 10), p. 85.
16. Bruce Vandervort, *Wars of Imperial Conquest in Africa, 1830–1914* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1998).
17. The title of Lawrence James's review of Great Britain's conflicts might suffice here: *The Savage Wars: British Campaigns in Africa, 1870–1920* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985).
18. Patrick J. McGowan, 'African Military Coups d'État, 1956–2001: Frequency, Trends and Distribution', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 41 (September 2003), pp. 339–70; Samuel Decalo, *Coups and Army Rule in Africa* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1976), pp. 11–12; and Grace Steward Ibingira, *African Upheavals since Independence* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980), p. 267.
19. William Reno, *Warfare in Independent Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
20. Raymond W. Copson, *Africa's Wars and Prospects for Peace* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1994), p. 4. These numbers are similar to what Paul D. Williams reports in *War and Conflict in Africa* (note 5).

- Based on comparative child mortality, UNICEF claimed even that number is too low: *Children on the Front Line*, 3rd ed. (New York: UNICEF, 1989).
21. Lotta Themnér and Peter Wallensteen, 'Armed Conflict, 1946–2011', *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 49, No. 4 (July 2012), pp. 565–75; Ralph Sundberg, Kristine Eck, and Joakim Kreutz, 'Introducing the UCDP Non-State Conflict Dataset', *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 49, No. 2 (March 2012), pp. 351–62; and Kristine Eck and Lisa Hultman, 'One-Sided Violence Against Civilians in War', *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 44, No. 2 (March 2007), pp. 233–46. The specific versions of datasets used were: 'UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v.4–2014', 'UCDP Non-State Conflict Dataset v. 2.5–2014', and 'UCDP One-sided Violence Dataset v 1.4–2014', all June 2014. Datasets available at <http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/>
  22. Center for Systemic Peace, 'Major Episodes of Political Violence, 1945–2013', July 2014, data files and Codebook available at <http://www.systemicpeace.org>. Detailed description of the war intensity coding used by CSP is at Monty G. Marshall, 'Measuring the Social Impact of War', in Fen Hampson and David Malone (eds), *From Reaction to Conflict Prevention* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002), ch. 4.
  23. Monty G. Marshall, 'Codebook: Major Episodes of Political Violence and Conflict Regions', Center for Systemic Peace, April 30, 2013, p. 8. Specifically, the Center for Systemic Peace provides an average of credible estimates of the total directly related deaths for each conflict. For sources, see Center for Systemic Peace, 'War List' at <http://www.systemicpeace.org/warlist/warlist.htm>. This is a far less precise measure than UCDP 'battle deaths', but provides a relevant upper estimate, especially in Africa where many deaths do not get reported in specific accounts as required for inclusion in the UCDP count.
  24. In general MEPV is less apt to break a conflict into multiple conflicts when factions split than is Uppsala. On the other hand, MEPV is more likely to split conflicts over time, where there are clear high points with long periods of inactivity between.
  25. The low threshold introduces chronological bias (overrepresentation of recent wars), and is of less policy relevance. See the 'Objections' discussion later in this paper.
  26. Joshua Goldstein, *Winning the War on War* (New York: Dutton, 2011), pp. 232–8. For an African example, conflict between the Ethiopian government and Oromo rebels is counted as an 'active war' in 2013, though it has seen not seen major fighting for years.
  27. Williams, *War and Conflict in Africa* (note 5); Straus, 'Wars Do End!' (note 5).
  28. The intensity score is based on casualties, displaced persons, number of fighters, economic and social disruption; see Marshall, 'Codebook' (note 23), pp. 8–11.
  29. The plot shows the sum of conflict intensity scores – MEPV variables 'International War', 'Civil War' and 'Ethnic War' – for all countries in each region each year. 'Africa' includes continental Africa plus Madagascar, but excludes small island states (e.g. Seychelles, Comoros).
  30. Human Security Report Project, *Human Security Report 2012: Sexual Violence, Education, and War: Beyond the Mainstream Narrative* (Vancouver: Human Security Press, 2012), p. 194.
  31. *Global Peace Index, 2014* (Sydney: Institute for Economics and Peace, 2014), p. 9.
  32. 'UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset v.5–2014', 'UCDP Non-State Conflict Dataset v. 2.5–2014', and 'UCDP One-sided Violence Dataset v 1.4–2014', (note 21). These datasets are supplemented with Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), 'Battle Deaths Dataset 3.0', October 2009, available at <http://www.prio.org/Data/Armed-Conflict/>. The three UCDP datasets cover 1989–2013. The PRIO dataset covers state-based conflict from 1945 to 2008, with definitions, coding rules, and data sources compatible with UCDP. The battle deaths for state-based conflict used here is a merged series: PRIO data from 1945 to 1988, and UCDP data from 1989 to the present. Non-State and One-Sided series begin in 1989. In all cases, the 'Best Estimate' variable is used.
  33. Center for Systemic Peace, 'War List' (note 23). MEPV presents conflict deaths as grand totals per conflict, not annual estimates; as an approximation, deaths were distributed evenly over all years for each conflict, with the exception of the Eastern Congo conflict from 1996 on (see below).
  34. There are risks that for a particular conflict, both UCDP and the MEPV coders relied on the same primary sources – indeed, there is overlap in sources used by each project. Therefore, the two datasets do not provide fully independent verification of each other. Rather, the UCDP coding rules represent a casualty count using the strictest interpretation, in both definitions and verifiability, of the available evidence; MEPV a widely accepted interpretation of 'related deaths', but which has not been verified in detail.
  35. The 1960s spikes are the Algerian independence war and the Biafra War in Nigeria.

36. Conversely, conflicts that simmered and only recently flared would have their most recent death rates understated. Nigeria – Boko Haram falls in that category, though the de-escalating cases of Somalia, Darfur, and DRC are all much larger.
37. Benjamin Coughlin *et al.*, 'Mortality in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: An Ongoing Crisis', International Rescue Committee, 2007. Human Security Report Project, Human Security Report 2009/2010: The Causes of Peace and the Shrinking Costs of War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 123–31.
38. Our estimate has 45,000 deaths/yr in the DRC after 2002. The World Health Organization has generally estimated 15,000–20,000/yr in that period. At the extreme, MEPV shows 2,500,000 as the cumulative total killed in both its 2008 and 2014 releases – implying a *zero* death rate in recent years!
39. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 'World Population Prospects – The 2010 Revision', data file 'Annual Population 1950–2010, Both Sexes', 28 June 2011, available at <http://esa.un.org/wpp/excel-data/population.htm>.
40. Data on Africa traffic fatalities over time is scarce, but one review article suggests rates in the 1990s were lower than today. In Nigeria, for example, traffic deaths increased at twice the rate of population growth from the 1980s to the 2000s. Emmanuelle Lagarde, 'Road Traffic Injury Is an Escalating Burden in Africa and Deserves Proportionate Research Efforts', *PLoS Medicine*, Vol. 4, No. 6 (June 2007).
41. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *Global Study on Homicide: Trends, Contexts, Data* (Vienna: UNODC, 2011).
42. Herbst, 'War and the State in Africa' (note 2), p. 124, and 'The Creation and Maintenance of National Boundaries in Africa', *International Organization*, Vol. 43, No. 4 (Autumn 1989), pp. 673–92.
43. *Foreign Policy* magazine publishes an annual analysis of state failure, [www.foreignpolicy.com/failedstates](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/failedstates). For coup data, see Center for Systemic Peace, 'Coups d'Etat, 1946–2012', available at <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html>.
44. Minorities at Risk Project, 'Minorities at Risk Dataset' (College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, 2009). This mirrors the overall worldwide reduction in discrimination against minority groups; see Victor Asal and Amy Pate, 'The Decline of Ethnic Political Discrimination, 1950–2003', in Monty G. Marshall and Ted Robert Gurr (eds), *Peace and Conflict 2005: A Global Survey of Armed Conflicts, Self-Determination Movements, and Democracy* (College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, 2005), pp. 28–35.
45. James L. Payne, *A History of Force: Exploring the Worldwide Movement against Habits of Coercion, Bloodshed, and Mayhem* (Sandpoint, ID: Lytton Publishers, 2004), pp. 8–10. A similar point is made by Goldstein, *Winning the War on War* (note 26), pp. 238–43.
46. One promising approach is automated coding of large volumes of news reports – or even making use of things such as geo-located Twitter posts – to provide conflict data at much finer temporal and spatial scales. The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) is particularly well developed. It only covers recent years and so does not support long-term trend analysis, however. Clionadh Raleigh, Andrew Linke, Havard Hegre, and Joakim Karlsen, 'Introducing ACLED: An Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset', *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 47, No. 5 (2010), pp. 651–60.
47. Reno, *Warfare in Independent Africa* (note 19).
48. Kelly M. Greenhill, 'Counting the Cost: The Politics of Numbers in Armed Conflict', in Peter Andreas and Kelly M. Greenhill (eds), *Sex, Drugs and Body Counts: The Politics of Numbers in Global Crime and Conflict* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010); Jay Aronson, 'The Politics of Civilian Casualty Counts', in Taylor B. Seybolt, Jay D. Aronson, and Baruch Fischhoff (eds), *Counting Civilian Casualties: An Introduction to Recording and Estimating Nonmilitary Deaths in Conflict* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013); Christopher Cramer, Laura Hammond, and Johan Pottier (eds), *Researching Violence in Africa: Ethical and Methodological Challenges* (Boston, MA: Brill, 2011).
49. Activist David Rieff notes, 'Sadly, over the course of the past few decades, exaggeration seems to have become the rule in the world of humanitarian relief. If they do not exaggerate, private donations and government and U.N. grants to their organizations will dry up.' 'Millions May Die . . . Or Not', *Foreign Policy*, No. 188 (September/October 2011), p. 1.
50. Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*, 3rd ed. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012).
51. Stathis N. Kalyvas, "'New" and "Old" Civil Wars: A Valid Distinction?', *World Politics*, Vol. 54, No. 1 (October 2001), pp. 99–118; Christopher J.L. Murray, Gary King, Alan D. Lopez, Niels Tomijima, and Etienne G. Krug, 'Armed Conflict as a Public Health Problem', *British Medical Journal*, Vol. 324,



- No. 7333 (9 February 2002), pp. 346–9; Errol A. Henderson and J. David Singer, “‘New Wars’ and Rumors of ‘New Wars’”, *International Interactions*, Vol. 28, No. 2 (April 2002), pp. 165–90; Taylor B. Seybolt, ‘Significant Numbers: Civilian Casualties and Strategic Peacebuilding’, in Seybolt *et al.*, *Counting Civilian Casualties* (note 48), pp. 15–28.
52. Erik Melander, Magnus Öberg, and Jonathan Hall, ‘Are “New Wars” More Atrocious? Battle Severity, Civilians Killed and Forced Migration before and after the End of the Cold War’, *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 15, No. 3 (September 2009), pp. 505–36.
  53. Coughlin *et al.*, ‘Mortality in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’ (note 37). Their 2007 survey found that only 0.6 per cent of the excess mortality was due to violence of any sort, which presumably includes violence other than armed conflict (i.e. domestic violence).
  54. Human Security Report Project, Human Security Report 2009/2010 (note 37), pp. 123–31. For more technical critiques of retrospective survey methods, see Ewa Tabeau and Jan Zwierchowski, ‘A Review of Estimation Methods for Victims of the Bosnian War and Khmer Rouge Regime’, in Seybolt *et al.*, *Counting Civilian Casualties* (note 48).
  55. The IRC assumes that 100 per cent of DRC’s deaths above the average sub-Saharan Africa rate are due to the conflict, and 0 per cent due to any other characteristic of DRC/Zaire – even for provinces on the far side of the country from most fighting. The Human Security Report (HSR) makes a convincing case that pre-1996 mortality in the DRC was significantly above the sub-Saharan average. That is not surprising given the weak service delivery and extreme poverty (outside the elite) of the former Zaire. HSR’s analysis of what data there is on Zaire and their extrapolation from a subset of countries better matched with Zaire/DRC is a more sound approach. Half of African nations have above average death rates, of course, so factors other than conflict must influence mortality.
  56. Anita Gohdes and Megan Price, ‘First Things First: Assessing Data Quality before Model Quality’, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 57, No. 6 (December 2013), pp. 1090–108.
  57. Bethany Lacina and Nils Petter Gleditsch, ‘The Waning of War Is Real: A Response to Gohdes and Price’, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 57, No. 6 (December 2013), pp. 1109–27.
  58. Clionadh Raleigh and Caitriona Dowd, ‘Conflict Trends, No. 29 (August 2014)’, Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, [www.acleddata.com](http://www.acleddata.com)
  59. LEXIS/NEXIS searches, August 2014.
  60. Keith Krause, for example, argues that scholars and policymakers should focus on all ‘lethal violence’ under a broad ‘human security’ perspective. ‘Challenges to Counting and Classifying Victims of Violence’, in Seybolt *et al.*, *Counting Civilian Casualties* (note 48).
  61. *Global Study on Homicide 2013* (Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, March 2014), p. 23. Note that the UNDOC definition of homicide *excludes* killings that are part of ‘war and conflict’. The African rate in 2013 was 12.5 per 100,000 vs a global mean of 6.2, and about 22 per 100,000 in Central and South America. The highest rates in individual *countries* are mostly in Central America and the Caribbean (eight of the top ten).
  62. This is true even geographically: armed conflict is concentrated in the Sahel and Great Lakes, while UNDOC shows non-conflict homicides are concentrated in Southern Africa. Lumping all ‘violence’ together would confuse, not clarify.
  63. Dennis Rodgers and Robert Muggah, ‘Gangs as Non-State Armed Groups: The Central American Case’, *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (2009), pp. 301–17; Jeffrey Gettleman, ‘Forever Wars: Why the Continent’s Conflicts Never End’, *Foreign Policy*, No. 178 (March/April 2010), pp. 73–5; John Mueller, *The Remnants of War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004).
  64. Kristine Hoglund and Mimmi Soderberg Kovacs, ‘Beyond the Absence of War: The Diversity of Peace in Post-Settlement Societies’, *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 36, No. 2 (April 2010), pp. 367–90. Johann Galtung, ‘Violence, Peace, and Peace Research’, *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 6, No. 3 (1969), pp. 167–91.
  65. The Economist Economic Intelligence Unit, ‘Democracy Index 2011: Democracy under Stress’.
  66. Arch Puddington, ‘Freedom in the World 2013: Democratic Breakthroughs in the Balance’, Freedom House, 2013. See also Jakkie Cilliers and Julia Schunemann, ‘The Future of Intrastate Conflict in Africa’, ISS Paper No. 248, Institute for Security Studies [South Africa], May 2013, pp. 6–7.
  67. Håvard Hegre, ‘Democracy and Armed Conflict’, *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 51, No. 2 (March 2014), pp. 159–72.
  68. Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jagers, *Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2002*, Version p4v2002e (College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland, 2002).

69. Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, *Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005).
70. On the rise of election-related violence, see Straus, 'Wars Do End!' (note 5).
71. Stephen G. Brooks, *Producing Security: Multinational Corporations, Globalization, and the Changing Calculus of Conflict* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005); Erik Gartzke, 'The Capitalist Peace', *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 51, No. 1 (January 2007), pp. 166–91; and Erik Gartzke and J. Joseph Hewitt, 'International Crises and the Capitalist Peace', *International Interactions*, Vol. 36, No. 2 (April 2010), pp. 115–45.
72. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, 'On the Incidence of Civil War in Africa', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 46, No. 1 (February 2002), pp. 13–28; James Fearon and David Laitin, 'Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War', *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 97, No. 1 (February 2003), pp. 75–90.
73. Shantayanan Devarajan and Wolfgang Fengler, 'Africa's Economic Boom: Why the Pessimists and Optimists Are Both Right', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 92, No. 3 (May/June 2013), pp. 68–81; World Bank, *Africa's Future and the World Bank's Support to It* (Washington, DC: March 2011), p. 4.
74. 'Emerging Africa', *The Economist*, 2 March 2013.
75. David Brooks, 'The Real Africa', *New York Times*, 8 May 2014, p. A27. 'Despite Challenges, Africans Are Optimistic About the Future', Pew Global Attitudes Project, 8 November 2013.
76. One study found the specific combination of a negative economic shock to a poor country led to a 50 per cent increase in the likelihood of civil war. Edward Miguel, Shanker Satyanath, and Ernest Sergenti, 'Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict: An Instrumental Variables Approach', *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 112, No. 4 (August 2004), pp. 725–53.
77. Quoted by David S. Fick, *Entrepreneurship in Africa: A Study of Success* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing, 2002), p. 289.
78. Paul Collier, *The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done about It* (Oxford: Oxford University, 2007), ch. 4.
79. Straus, 'Wars Do End!' (note 5). Stathis Kalyvas and Laia Balcells, 'International System and the Technologies of Rebellion: How the End of the Cold War Shaped Internal Conflict', *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 104, No. 3 (August 2010), pp. 415–29.
80. This extends even to potentially contentious issues like access to oil. See Nicholas Bariyo and Wayne Ma, 'China Presses Oil-Rich Sudans to Cooperate', *Wall Street Journal*, 24 April 2012. Shannon Tiezzi, 'In South Sudan Conflict, China Tests Its Mediation Skills', *The Diplomat*, 6 June 2014. On China's role in Africa see Robert Rotberg (ed.), *China into Africa: Trade, Aid, and Influence* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008).
81. Louis Charbonneau and Michelle Nichols, 'Rwanda, Uganda Arming Congo Rebels, Providing Troops – U.N. Panel', *Reuters*, 17 October 2012. On the defeat of M23, Nicholas Kulish, 'After Outside Pressure, Rebels in Congo Lay Down Their Arms', *New York Times*, 5 November 2013.
82. Daniel Byman, 'Breaking the Bonds between Al-Qa'ida and Its Affiliate Organizations', Brookings Analysis Paper No. 27, Brookings Institution, August 2012.
83. Collier, *The Bottom Billion* (note 78), chs. 2 and 3; William Reno, *Warlord Politics and African States* (Boulder, CO: Lynne-Rienner, 1999); Jennifer Hazen, *What Rebels Want: Resources and Supply Networks in Wartime* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013).
84. The 'Kimberly Process' group, for example, moved to place a diamond embargo on the Central African Republic in the wake of the Seleka rebel seizure of power in early 2013. Alexis Flynn, 'Central African Republic Faces Diamond Ban', *Wall Street Journal*, 10 May 2013.
85. For a comprehensive list of peacekeeping in Africa, see Williams, *War and Conflict in Africa* (note 5), ch. 10.
86. Andrew Mack, 'Global Political Violence: Explaining the Post-Cold War Decline', Coping with Crisis Working Paper Series, International Peace Academy, March 2007.
87. Virginia Page Fortna, *Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents' Choices after Civil War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008); Peter Wallensteen and Isak Svensson, 'Talking Peace: International Mediation in Armed Conflicts', *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 51, No. 2 (March 2014), pp. 315–29.
88. For an explanation of the difference between the two, see Robert I. Rotberg (ed.) *Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement in Africa: Methods of Conflict Prevention* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000).
89. Evan Luard, *War in International Society: A Study in International Sociology* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1986), p. 15.
90. Reid, *Warfare in African History* (note 10), p. 12.

91. John Mueller, *Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War* (New York: Basic Books, 1989) and *The Remnants of War* (note 63); Christopher J. Fettweis, *Dangerous Times? The International Politics of Great Power Peace* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2010); and Steven Pinker, *The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined* (New York: Viking, 2011).
92. Monty G. Marshall and Benjamin R. Cole, *Global Report 2011: Conflict, Governance and State Fragility*, (Vienna, VA: Center for Systemic Peace, 2011); and Human Security Report Project, *Human Security Report 2009/2010* (note 37).
93. Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), pp. 76 and 127.
94. Fettweis, *Dangerous Times?* (note 91); Robert Jervis, 'Theories of War in an Era of Leading-Power Peace', *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 96, No. 1 (March 2002), p. 9; and Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Relations* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 312.
95. Robert D. Kaplan, 'Why So Much Anarchy?', *Stratfor*, 5 February 2014.